Rational-choice and functional explanations

Introduction
• Actor may fail to cooperate even when their interests are identical
• The author accepts the Realist assumption that actors are rational egoists => their preferences are based on their assessment of their own welfare
o BUT he argues that this assumption is consistent with the formation of international regimes

Single-Play prisoners’ dilemma and the problem of Collective Action
• Prisoners’ dilemma (PD) => by the nature of the interaction involved in the game, to “defect” is the dominant strategy for both players
• Collective action logic => similar to prisoners’ dilemma but with higher number of actors
• If cooperation is need to a good that will be enjoyed by all the actors disregarding their participation
• If the contribution to the cost of a good is small as a proportion of its total cost
• Then self-interested individuals are better off not contributing
• thus leaving the collective good underproduced
• The author argues that these two models show that the inability to cooperate is inherited in the patterns of interaction in the system.
• As PD shows, barriers to information and communication can hinder cooperation even when common interest exist